Weaknesses of an efficient and secure dynamic ID-based remote user authentication scheme  by Mart’nez-Peláez, Rafael & Rico-Novella, Francisco
 Procedia Technology  3 ( 2012 )  351 – 353 
2212-0173 © 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
doi: 10.1016/j.protcy.2012.03.038 
The 2012 Iberoamerican Conference on Electronics Engineering and Computer Science 
Weaknesses of an efficient and secure dynamic ID-based remote user 
authentication scheme 
Rafael Martínez-Peláeza,, Francisco Rico-Novellab 
aUniversidad de la Sierra Sur, Calle Guillermo Rojas Mijangos S/N, Esq. Av. Universidad Col. Ciudad Universitaria, Miahuatlán de Porfirio Díaz, México 
bTechnical University of Catalonia, Department of Telematics Engineering, Jordi Girona 1-3 C3, 08034 Barcelona, Spain 
 
Abstract 
Recently, Wang, Liu, Xiao and Dan proposed an efficient and secure dynamic ID-based remote user authentication scheme and claimed that 
their scheme provides strong security. We demonstrate that Wang et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to insider, masquerade and server spoofing 
attacks. 
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1. Introduction 
In 1991, Chang and Wu [1] proposed a remote user authentication scheme using smart cards. Since 1991 several remote user 
authentication schemes using smart cards have been proposed [2-8] to enhance the security and reduce the computational cost, 
and provide services to electronic activities. 
In 2002, Chien et al. proposed a remote user authentication scheme [2]. The merits of Chien et al.’s scheme are: the scheme 
requires low-computational and low-communication cost, and provide mutual authentication. Although, the scheme does not 
maintain a verification table, the server must maintain a table to store the users’ ID to check its validity. However, Hsu 
demonstrated that Chien et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to parallel session attack [9]. Das et al. proposed a dynamic ID-based 
remote user authentication scheme using smart cards [5]. They introduced the concept of dynamic ID-based which prevents that 
an attacker can know the user’s ID. However, the scheme is susceptible to insider, masquerade, and server spoofing attacks [7]. 
In 2009, Wang et al. [7] presented an authentication scheme to provide mutual authentication between a user and a remote 
server, and resolves the security flaws of Das et al. scheme. 
In this paper, we demonstrate that Wang et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to insider, masquerade, and server spoofing attacks. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give a brief review on Wang et al.’s scheme. We demonstrate 
the vulnerabilities of Wang et al.’s scheme, in Section 3. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 4. 
2. Wang et al.’s scheme 
Wang et al. [7] proposed a dynamic ID-based remote user authentication scheme in which the remote server does not maintain 
a verification table and chooses the user’s password. Moreover, the scheme establishes a mutual authentication. The scheme 
consists of four phases – registration, login, verification, and password change. We explain the registration, login, and 
verification phases, because we will use it to carry out the security analysis. Table 1 describes the notations used in this paper. 
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Table 1. Notations 
Notation Meaning 
U The user 
S The server 
ID Unique identity of U 
PW Unique password of U 
h(.) A one-way hash function 
SK(.) A symmetric encryption function 
x, y  Secret keys of S 
 Exclusive-or operation 
|| String concatenation operation 
2.1. Registration phase 
When U wants to access the resources of S, she submits her ID to S, through a secure channel. Then, S performs the following 
operations: 
1. Chooses PW. 
2. Computes A = h(PW)  h(x)  ID, where PW is chosen by S. 
3. Sends (PW, A, y, h(.)) to U, through a secure channel. 
Note that U’s smart card contains A, y, and h(.). 
2.2. Login phase 
The user U keys her ID and PW. Then, the smart card performs the following operations: 
1. Computes CID = h(PW)  h(A  y  T)  ID, where T is the current date and time of Ui’s device. 
2. Sends the login request message (ID, CID, A, T) to S. 
2.3. Verification phase 
Upon receiving the login request message, S verifies the time interval between T and T*, where T* is the arrival time of the 
message. If the time interval is correct, S performs the following operations: 
1. Computes h(PW)* = CID  h(A  y  T)  ID and ID* = h(PW)*  h(x)  A. 
Then, S checks whether or not ID* is equal to ID. If the verification fails, S rejects the request; otherwise, S confirms the 
identity of U and performs the following operations: 
2. Computes B = h(h(PW)*  y  T2). 
3. Sends (B, T2) to U. 
 
Upon receiving the acknowledgement message (B, T2), U checks the validity of the timestamp T2 and performs the following 
operation: 
4. Computes B* = h(h(PWi)  y  T2). 
Then, U checks whether or not B* is equal to B. If it holds, U confirms the identity of S. 
3. Cryptanalysis of Wang et al.’s scheme 
In this section, we demonstrate that Wang et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to insider, masquerade, and server spoofing attacks. 
3.1. Insider attack 
We demonstrate that Wang et al.’s scheme cannot resistance the insider attack. The attacker can create a valid login request 
message, if she obtains A, h(x), and y. The process to obtain these parameters is as follows: 
If the attacker is a legal user U, she can extract h(x) from A computing h(x) = h(PW)  A  ID, and she knows y. 
If the attacker has intercepted a previous login request message (ID, CID, A, T), she knows ID, and A. 
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Then, the attacker can impersonate U as follows: 
1. Chooses a random password PWfalse and computes h(PWfalse). 
2. Computes Afalse = h(PWfalse)  h(x)  ID. 
3. Computes CIDfalse = h(PWfalse)  h(Afalse  y  T1)  ID, where T1 is the current date and time of attacker’s device 
4. Sends the imitative login request message (ID, CIDfalse, Afalse, T1) to S. 
Upon receiving the imitative login request message (ID, CIDfalse, Afalse, T1) and checking the validity of the time interval, S 
will compute h(PWfalse)* = CIDfalse  h(Afalse  y  T1)  ID and ID* = CIDfalse  h(Afalse  y  T1)  h(PWfalse)*. Then, S will 
check whether ID* is equal to ID. In this case, S will accept the attacker’s login request message because ID* is equal to ID. 
3.2. Masquerade attack 
We demonstrate that Wang et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to masquerade attack. The attacker can masquerade as legal user U 
creating a valid login request message. If the attacker is a legal user U, she knows y. Then, if she has intercepted a previous U’s 
login request message (ID, CID, A, T), she can masquerade as a legal user U as follows:  
1. Computes h(A  y  T)*. 
2. Extracts h(PW) from CID computing h(PW)* = CID  h(A  y  T)*  ID. 
3. Computes CIDfalse = h(PW)*  h(A  y  T1)*  Ii, where T1 is the current date and time of attacker’s device. 
4. Sends the imitative login request message (ID, CIDfalse, A, T1) to S. 
Upon receiving the imitative login request message (ID, CIDfalse, A, T1) and checking the validity of the time interval, S will 
compute h(PW)* = CIDfalse  h(A  y  T1)  ID and ID* = CIDfalse  h(A  y  T1)  h(PW)*. Then, S will check whether or 
not ID* is equal to ID. In this case, S will accept the attacker’s login request message because ID* is equal to ID. 
3.3. Server spoofing attack 
We prove that Wang et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to server spoofing attack. In this scheme, S needs to know y and h(x) for 
verifying the legitimacy of each user. If the attacker is a legal user U, she can impersonate as S to cheat U because she knows y 
and h(x). After the user U receives the acknowledgement message (Bfalase, T2), she will compute B* = h(h(PWi)  y  T2) and 
checks whether or not B* is equal to Bfalse. In this case, U will believe that the attacker is the legal S. 
4. Conclusion and Future Work 
Wang et al.’s scheme was proposed for resolving security issues presented in previous work. However, we have discovered 
some security flaws in the Wang et al.’s scheme making it vulnerable to server spoofing, masquerade, and insider attacks. 
Moreover, the scheme fails to establish a session key between the user and the server for posterior communication. 
We are working in the design and evaluation of a new dynamic ID-based remote user authentication scheme which provides 
strong security. 
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